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A growing body of recent literature attempts to explain the divergent performance of European and US labor markets
during the 80’s and 90’s. Generally, the focus has been upon interactions of labor market institutions with other
economic variables [cf. Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998,2004), den Haan, Haefke, and Ramey (2001)] and upon hiring
and ﬁring restrictions. However, relatively little attention has been paid to one of the primary ways in which US and
European economies differ: the degree of product market regulation. To give an idea of the magnitudes involved,
Table 1 presents an index of barriers to entry in the US and in the European Union, compiled by Fonseca, Lopez and
Pissarides (2001) and based on OECD data. The index combines the average time required to establish a standardized
ﬁrm with the number of procedures necessary into a weeks-based measure of entry delay. The measured delays range
from 8.6 business days in the United States to a whopping 85 days in Spain. The population-weighted EU average of
54.7 days is many times larger than the corresponding American ﬁgure. Djankov, et.al. (2002) report data on a second
dimension of entry barriers, namely the pecuniary cost of establishing a standardized ﬁrm as a percentage of the per
capita GDP of the respective country. This data is also reproduced in Table 1. Once again, the gulf between the Anglo-
American world and Europe is striking: establishing a ﬁrm in the US costs less than 1% of per capita GDP, while
establishing the average continental European ﬁrm costs 18.4% of per capita GDP. The European barriers to entry
are an order of magnitude larger. Table 1 also compares the Fonseca et. al. index to Djankov, et. al.’s independent
data on entry delay: it is easy to see that both data sources tell the same story. Continental European barriers to entry
are substantially higher than those in the Anglo-American countries. It seems reasonable that such large differences
in entry barriers might translate into large differences in labor market outcomes. Krueger and Pischke (1997) also
conjecture that large parts of the U.S. American employment miracle can be attributed to its ﬂexible product markets.
Indeed, there is a growing body of empirical evidence to support the link between product market regulation and
labor markets. Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) examine the impact of French legislation1, which regulated entry into
French retailing. They ﬁnd that those regions (departements) which restricted entry more strongly, experienced slower
rates of job growth. Boeri, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2000), using an OECD index of the degree of product market
regulation, also report a negative relationship between their regulation measure and employment. Fonseca, et. al.
(2001) show that their index of entry barriers is negatively correlated with employment and positively correlated with
unemployment rates. Moreover, the timing of US deregulation efforts, which began in the late 1970’s, ﬁts neatly into
the picture of labor market performance which began to diverge in the early 80’s. The most important pieces of US
deregulation were put into place in the late 70’s and early 80’s. These measures were accompanied by an overall push
to reduce “red tape”. In contrast, European deregulation efforts are still incipient. Hence, product market deregulation
is a sort of smoking gun for divergent US and European labor market performance, whose implications are worth
investigating.
Relatively little previous theoretical work has analyzed whether and how product market rigidities may affect
equilibrium labor market outcomes. Nickell (1999) provides an insightful overview of early work which is either
1Loi Royer of 1974
2partial equilibrium or employing some form of collective bargaining. Recent important contributions are the papers
of Pissarides (2001) and Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003). Pissarides (2001) focuses on the impact of entry barriers
on the decision to become an entrepreneur or a worker, ﬁnding that entry barriers can indeed lead to lower rates of
entrepreneurship and hence job creation, and ultimately to higher rates of equilibrium unemployment. However, those
ﬁrms which have overcome the barriers to entry then face perfect competition. In contrast, Blanchard and Giavazzi
(2003) study labor market outcomes in a model with monopolistic competition but with a more stylized labor-market
setting. They ﬁnd that equilibrium unemployment is decreasing in the degree of product market competition, and
also emphasize that equilibrium wages are increasing in the degree of product market competition. In a similar vein,
Spector (2002) studies the effects of changes in the intensity of product market competition in a model with capital
and concludes that product-market and labor-market regulations tend to reinforce each other. The latter two papers
consider static or two-period setups.
We contribute to the product market/labor market debate by specifying a fully dynamic matching model which
we believe to be very well suited for both the theoretical and the quantitative study of product- and labor market
issues. Our model combines monopolistic competition in the goods market with fully-microfounded unemployment
arising from Mortensen-Pissarides-style matching frictions. To allow ﬁrms to adjust output in response to varying
degrees of product market competition [as predicted by ﬁrst principles], we allow for multi-worker ﬁrms. Wages are
the result of pairwise Nash bargaining between individual workers and ﬁrms. This individual Nash-bargaining setup
has been shown by Stole and Zwiebel (1996, 1996a) to be the appropriate one for multi-worker ﬁrms, in the sense that
pairwise individual bargaining is representable as a Binmore-Rubinstein-Wolinsky alternating offer game, providing a
microfoundation for the use of Nash bargaining.
We use our model in two ways. First, we investigate the link between the degree of product market competition
and the labor market equilibrium both theoretically and quantitatively, with a special focus on the equilibrium unem-
ployment rate. We identify two main channels by which competition affects unemployment. The ﬁrst is the output
expansion effect. From ﬁrst principles, ﬁrms with monopoly power maximize proﬁts by restricting output with respect
to its full-competition level. As competition increases, proﬁt-maximizing output expands, and along with it the de-
mand for labor. This in turn implies a greater rate of vacancy creation,which leads to a lower rate of unemployment.
The second channel is due to the effects of competition on individual wage-bargaining and is countervailing. As will
be explained in detail in section 2, individual bargaining gives ﬁrms an incentive to hire more than the socially efﬁ-
cient number of workers, as ﬁrst noted by Stole and Zwiebel (1996, 1996a). We show that this overhiring effect is
strongest at low levels of competition. As competition increases, overhiring is diminished, placing downward pressure
on vacancy creation and counteracting the output expansion effect.
The degree to which the overhiring effect will be able to eat away at the output-expansion effects of increasing
competition is ultimately a quantitative question, which we address in Sections 4 and 5. Quantitatively, we will ﬁnd
that the overhiring effect is indeed strong, in the sense that it does counteract most of the output expansion effect
on equilibrium unemployment. As a result, the impact of product market competition on equilibrium unemployment
turns out to be surprisingly weak under individual bargaining. In our benchmark calibration, unemployment falls by
3only about two percentage points when the demand elasticity facing individual ﬁrms is increased ﬁvefold. Increasing
the elasticity even further has only negligible impact on labor market variables. Hence we conclude: a little bit of
competition goes a long way. Our result is fully consistent with the empirical results of Bresnahan and Reiss (1991),
who ﬁnd that “once the market has between three and ﬁve ﬁrms, the next entrant has little effect on competitive
conduct”.
In qualitative terms, our results are quite similar to those of Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), Fonseca, et. al. (2001)
and Pissarides (2001). We conﬁrm both authors’ results on the beneﬁts of product market competition for lowering
equilibrium unemployment rates. We also conﬁrm Blanchard and Giavazzi’s ﬁnding that greater degrees of product
market competition lead to higher real wages. In addition, we ﬁnd these wage increases to be quantitatively substantial.
The move from a US-style to a European-style regulatory regime would lead to an increase in net real wages of about
11%, lending support to Blanchard and Giavazzi’s argument that product market reform could be used as a sort of
spoonful of sugar to help the medicine of labor market reform go down more easily.
The second way in which we apply our model is to study the link between entry barriers and the labor market
equilibrium. Introducingentrybarriersallowsustoendogenizethedegreeofproductmarketcompetition. Wecalibrate
the model using the previously cited data on barriers to entry, and investigate the quantitative impact of barriers to
entry on equilibrium unemployment. In particular, we ask how much of the difference in US and continental European
unemployment rates can be explained by the observed differences in barriers to entry. We ﬁnd that the substantial
differences in entry barriers can only account for a surprisingly small difference in equilibrium unemployment rates
of less than one-half of a percentage point. By means of comparison, the unemployment differential generated by
observed differences in replacement rates [unemployment beneﬁts] is more than six times as large. This surprising
resultisduetothecountervailingimpactofindividualbargaining. Hence, weconcludethatindividualwage-bargaining
is able to substantially mitigate the impact of ﬁrms’ monopoly power, and hence also mitigate the negative impact of
entry regulation.2
Finally, we are able to contribute to the recent discussion on the robustness of Stole and Zwiebel (1996a)’s over-
hiring results to the presence of a pool of replacement workers. In a partial equilibrium setting, De Fontenay and Gans
(2003) show that the availability of a ﬁnite pool of replacement workers with given reservation wage reverses Stole
and Zwiebel’s overhiring effect under individual bargaining. They argue that there is no need to actually hire addi-
tional workers to depress wages, since the threat of replacing them from the pool of alternative workers is sufﬁcient
to put downward pressure wages. In their reply, Stole and Zwiebel (2003) note that a general equilibrium analysis
would be necessary to address this issue more conclusively. We provide just such a general equilibrium analysis, in
which optimal ﬁrm size, as well as the size of the pool of available replacement workers (the unemployed) and their
reservation wages are determined endogenously. We ﬁnd that Stole and Zwiebel (1996a)’s hiring externality does
indeed survive the transition to general equilibrium and replaceable workers, in the sense that proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms
do indeed expand hiring in a (successful) attempt to depress wages. In addition, we ﬁnd evidence for the presence
2In a companion paper, we investigate under which circumstances individual bargaining is robust to the formation of collective bargaining
coalitions.
4of overhiring, in the sense that workers’ equilibrium wages may exceed their marginal (revenue) product to the ﬁrm.
However, we also ﬁnd that the hiring externality arises only in the presence of imperfect product market competition,
and that the net effect of imperfect competition and individual bargaining is underhiring.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3 characterizes
short and long-run equilibrium, and presents analytic results on the impact of product market competition on labor
market equilibrium. Section 4 focuses on quantitative analysis, and examines the ability of observed differences in
entry barriers to account for the gap between US and continental European unemployment rates. Section 5 explores
the constrained Pareto efﬁciency properties of our model, while Section 6 concludes.
2 The Basic Model
In this section we present the basic general equilibrium model. Its main elements are monopolistic competition in
the goods market and Mortensen-Pissarides-style matching in the labor market. Our innovation lies in deﬁning and
solving the multi-worker ﬁrm’s problem under monopolistic competition and individual bargaining. The households’
problems are standard. We restrict our analysis to the steady state.
2.1 Households
2.1.1 Search and Matching in the Labor Market
The labor market is characterized by a standard search and matching framework (e.g. Pissarides, 2000). Unemployed
workers u and vacancies v are converted into matches by a constant returns to scale matching function3 m(u,v) =
s·uηv1−η. Deﬁning labor market tightness as θ ≡ v
u, the ﬁrm meets unemployed workers at rate q (θ) = sθ−η, while
the unemployed workers meet vacancies at rate θq (θ) = sθ1−η.
In the basic model, workers and ﬁrms are identical so that all jobs are identical. For each worker, the value of
employment is given by V E, which satisﬁes4:
rV E = w − χ
£
V E − V U¤
(1)
where χ is the total separation rate, w denotes the per period nominal wage, and V U the value of being unemployed.
Firms and workers may separate either because the match is destroyed, which occurs with probability ˜ χ or because
the ﬁrm has exited, which occurs with probability δ. We assume that these two sources of separation are independent,
so that the total separation probability is given by χ = e χ + δ − e χδ. Explicit ﬁrm exit is incorporated mainly for
3As is quite standard in the literature, s denotes a scaling parameter which serves to bring matching rates within the [0,1] interval, while η
denotes the elasticity of matches with respect to the number of unemployed.
4We assume that all payments are made at the end of a period so that our value functions in discrete time actually coincide with their continuous





w + (1 − χ)V E + χV U¢
5quantitative reasons. If ﬁrms were counterfactually inﬁnitely lived, then the impact of a given level of entry costs
would be greatly understated, since ﬁrms could amortize those entry costs over an inﬁnite lifespan.
The value of unemployment is standard and is the same for all workers:
rV U = bP + θq (θ)
£
V E − V U¤
(2)
where P denotes the aggregate price level and b real unemployment beneﬁts.
2.1.2 Monopolistic Competition in the Goods Market
Households are both consumers and workers. As consumers they are risk neutral in the aggregate consumption good.
Agents have Dixit-Stiglitz preferences over a continuum of differentiated goods. Goods demand each period is derived














P di where In denotes the real income of household n and ci,n is household
n’s consumption of good i. In order to focus the dynamics on the labor market, there is no saving. Thus we obtain




















is the price index. Equation (4) is the standard
monopolistic-competition demand function with elasticity of substitution among differentiated goods given by −σ.
2.2 Modeling Competition
In principle, there are two ways in which greater competition may manifest itself: as greater competition within each
industry or as greater competition among industries. Greater competition among industries would imply an increase
in the elasticity of substitution among differentiated goods σ. In fact Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) ﬁnd some evidence
for increased product differentiation in the French retail industry in response to the Loi Royer. However, it is often
argued that σ is a preference parameter rather than a measure of competition. We address this concern in the basic
model by treating σ as a ﬁxed preference parameter. That is, we will not rely on variations in σ to model differing
degrees of competition. Rather, we follow Gal´ ı (1995) in assuming that each differentiated good i is produced by an
industry populated by ni ﬁrms. An increase in the number of ﬁrms in each industry leads to an increase in the degree
of competition within each industry, as captured by an increase in the demand elasticity faced by each individual ﬁrm.
The ﬁrms within each industry compete by Cournot.5 Under Cournot competition, ﬁrm j in industry i has output
Yij which satisﬁes:
Y S
i = Yij + (ni − 1)Y i,−j, (5)
5In the basic model, we focus on the collusion-free equilibrium of the dynamic Cournot game. Collusive equilibria would involve even greater
output restriction at each industry size, which would strengthen our results.
6where Y S
i is aggregate supply of good i and Y i,−j is the average output of ﬁrm j’s ni −1 competitors. From (4), ﬁrm



























When ﬁrms within an industry are symmetric, each ﬁrm faces a demand elasticity which depends only on the total
number of ﬁrms present in the industry:
ξi = niσ. (8)
In the basic model we will assume symmetric ﬁrms in equilibrium. In what follows we will label ﬁrms only by their
industry i.6
Our competition framework turns out to be very ﬂexible and tractable. The equilibrium condition will turn out to
depend only upon ξi, and not upon σ or ni independently. Hence, it becomes equivalent to vary competition by varying
industry size, holding σ constant, or to vary competition by varying the elasticity of substitution across differentiated
goods σ, holding industry size constant, as in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003).
2.3 Multiple-worker Firms
The standard Mortensen-Pissarides setup assumes one-worker ﬁrms. Under perfect competition in goods markets, this
assumptionisharmless, sincethenumberandsizeofﬁrmsisindeterminate. Undermonopolisticcompetition, however,
ﬁrms react to downward sloping demand by restricting output. The only way to vary output with a given technology
is to vary the amount of labor employed either on the intensive margin or on the extensive margin.7 Consistent with
stylized facts we assume that ﬁrms adjust employment by varying the number of workers [extensive margin] rather
than the number of hours per worker. In our multi-worker ﬁrm model the number of workers employed is determined
endogenously, as a function of the elasticity of demand ξi.
Firms maximize the discounted value of future proﬁts. Firm i’s state variable is the number of workers currently
employed, Hi. The ﬁrm’s key decision is the number of vacancies. Firms open as many vacancies as necessary to
hire in expectation the desired number of workers next period, while taking into account that the real cost to opening
a vacancy is ΦV . The ﬁrm’s problem becomes:





















6To avoid confusion, we denote aggregate demand facing industry i by Y D
i , while industry i’s aggregate supply is denoted Y S
i and the output
of an individual ﬁrm in industry i is denoted Yi.
7In a model with capital, ﬁrms could also vary output by varying only the amount of capital employed. In order to maintain an optimal capital-
labor ratio, however, ﬁrms would also generally adjust by varying labor as well.
7production function: Yi = AHi (11)
transition function: H0
i = (1 − e χ)Hi + q (θ)vi (12)
wage curve: w(Hi) (13)
where the wage curve is subject to individual bargaining as described in section 2.4.1. The ﬁrm’s problem takes into
account that a measure δ of ﬁrms exits each period.












By (14), the marginal value of an additional worker must equal the cost of searching for him/her, weighted by the
probability of ﬁrm survival 1 − δ, neither of which is ﬁrm-speciﬁc.
Combining (14) with the envelope condition, using the deﬁnition of demand elasticity (7) and rearranging, yields
























where ξi is the ﬁrm-level elasticity of demand. Firms price their goods by taking a constant markup
ξi
ξi−1 on the
marginal cost of producing the good (the term in curly brackets). The marginal cost of labor (in square brackets) has
three terms: the unit labor cost
w(Hi)






, and the effect on the wage from hiring
another worker Hi
∂[w(Hi)/P]
∂Hi . The ﬁnal term reﬂects ﬁrms’ correct anticipation that the result of wage bargaining
will depend upon the number of workers hired. In addition, it is useful to note that (15) is an implicit labor demand
expression that relates the ﬁrm’s optimal employment choice to the wage.
2.4 Bargaining
In this section we describe the wage bargaining, allowing us to generate wage curves and complete the description of
labor demand. We focus on individual bargaining, based on Stole and Zwiebel (1996). The key assumption of the
Stole and Zwiebel (1996) individual bargaining framework used here is that ﬁrms engage in pairwise negotiations with
workers. When a worker joins the ﬁrm, wages are renegotiated individually with all workers. Hence, each worker is
treated as the marginal worker and the ﬁrm is essential in the bargaining process. By its very nature, individual
bargaining involves bargaining over wages only.
We believe that this is the appropriate bargaining setup for our model for two reasons. First, on theoretical grounds,
Stole and Zwiebel (1996) show that individual bargaining may be understood as a Binmore-Rubinstein-Wolinsky
(1986) alternating offer game, ensuring that the Nash-bargaining is fully microfounded. Hence the wage curve (20)
can be obtained either by fully modeling the pairwise bargaining structure, or by solving a standard generalized
Nash bargaining problem8. In this sense, individual bargaining is the natural extension of the Mortensen-Pissarides
8We know from e.g. Gul (1987) that symmetric Nash products can be used to compute the Shapley value. Following footnote 18 of Stole and
Zwiebel (1996) but using a generalized sharing rule (with weight β for workers and (1 − β) for ﬁrms), it is straightforward to derive a wage curve
equivalent to our equation (16).
8framework to multi-worker ﬁrms, since it allows us to derive the wage curve by solving the Nash bargaining problem.
Secondly, we later calibrate to US labor markets, which are better characterized by individual than by collective
bargaining.9
2.4.1 Individual Bargaining Solution
Under individual bargaining, the ﬁrm’s outside option is not remaining idle, but rather producing with one worker less.
The crucial point of the individual bargaining framework is that each worker is treated as the marginal worker. This can
be implemented in two ways: either by deﬁning ﬁrm’s surplus to be V J(Hi)−V J(Hi −1) or by taking the derivative
of V J with respect to Hi and considering this to be the contribution of the marginal worker. Following Cahuc and
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To obtain an expression for ﬁrm’s surplus, take the envelope condition of the ﬁrm’s problem (9), and recall that the
ﬁrst order condition (14) implies that ∂V
J















The worker’s surplus is standard:
V E − V U =
w(Hi) − rV U
r + χ
. (18)
Substituting the expressions for worker’s and ﬁrm’s surplus (17) and (18) into the ﬁrst order condition of (16) leads
to a ﬁrst-order linear differential equation in the wage







It is straightforward to conﬁrm that (19) has solution:
w(Hi)
P










Equation (20) is the wage curve under individual bargaining.
2.4.2 Hiring Externality
The individual bargaining solution presented above displays a hiring externality of the type ﬁrst explored in partial
equilibrium by Stole and Zwiebel (1996a). To see this, note that the wage curve (20) is downward sloping: as the















9In a companion paper, we compare our results to those derived under a collective bargaining framework, and show that collective bargaining
strengthens the impact of product market competition on unemployment and wages substantially.
9The reason is shrinking marginal revenue product [MRP] in conjunction with individual bargaining. To gain intu-
ition, note that the wage takes the standard form of the worker’s reservation utility plus a share β of the total match
surplus. Since each worker is treated as the marginal worker, total match surplus depends on the worker’s MRP, as




P . Monopoly power ensures that the MRP is decreasing, so that increasing employ-
ment/production reduces the wage. Since all workers are treated as the marginal worker, hiring an additional worker








¯. This hiring externality gives ﬁrms an incentive to hire more than the
socially optimal number of workers,10 analogous to the overhiring results in Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) and Smith
(1999). In Smith (1999) and Stole and Zwiebel (1996a), however, the source of decreasing MRP is not monopoly
power but decreasing returns to scale in production.
Importantly, the hiring externality is intimately linked to the degree of product market competition. First, note
that the hiring externality disappears in the perfect competition limit [as ξ → ∞]. This is in line with the results
of Cahuc and Wasmer (2001), who show that the hiring externality is absent in a model where constant returns to
scale and perfect competition lead to constant MRP. Furthermore, in our setting it is straightforward to show that the
hiring externality is stronger when monopoly power is greater.11 The intuition is that lower levels of competition are
associated with more steeply decreasing MRP, so that wages decline more sharply when ﬁrm employment increases at
low levels of competition. Hence, the hiring externality works to dampen the negative ﬁrst order effects of monopoly
power on employment.
The magnitude of the hiring externality is also increasing in worker’s bargaining power β. This is intuitive, since
the on average higher wages which accompany greater worker bargaining power give the ﬁrm an added incentive to
depress wages.
3 Equilibrium
We proceed to ﬁnd equilibrium in three steps. First, we focus on ﬁrm-level behavior, by identifying the ﬁrm’s optimal
employment-wage pair when it takes aggregate variables as given. Then, we go on to ﬁnd the quantities and prices
which are consistent with market clearing. This will allow us to obtain expressions for all equilibrium variables as
functions of the exogenous degree of competition - or equivalently as functions of the number of ﬁrms per industry.
We call this second stage short-run general equilibrium, since it treats the number of ﬁrms as given. In the last step,
we will introduce entry costs, which will serve to endogenize the number of ﬁrms per industry. This last equilibrium
will be referred to as long-run general equilibrium.
10Whether this hiring externality translates into overhiring will be examined in our section 5 on social efﬁciency. Also note that under individual
bargaining, it is natural to assume that it is the ﬁrm which controls ﬁrm size.







First, we focus on the ﬁrm’s optimal choices, taking aggregate variables as given. We already have the wage curve
(20), which was derived from the individual wage bargaining. An expression for labor demand may be obtained by


















Equation (22) can also be interpreted as a job creation condition. As expected, it is downward sloping, both in the
amount of labor demanded Hi and in labor market tightness θ.
DEFINITION 1 Firm-Level Equilibrium
A ﬁrm-level equilibrium is deﬁned as a pair of real wages and ﬁrm-level employment Hi which satisﬁes both labor
demand (22) and the individual bargaining wage curve (20), taking (θ,ξi,ni) as given.
Figure 1 illustrates the ﬁrm-level equilibrium graphically in the wage-employment space. Formally, optimal em-























The ﬁrm-level equilibrium real wage can be found by substituting (23) back into the job creation condition (22), and





















Note that although wages do not depend explicitly on demand elasticity ξi, they will depend on competition
indirectly, via equilibrium labor market tightness θ.
We can also compute the ﬁrm’s optimal employment explicitly by combining the ﬁrm-level equilibrium condition
(23) with the demand curve facing ﬁrm i (10) and with the reservation wage (25). Additionally imposing symmetric






















Firm-levelrealproﬁts cannowbe computedasthe differencebetweenrevenuesonthe onehand, and laborandvacancy









Hi (θ|I,ξi) − ΦV vi (27)
where vi is the steady-state level of vacancies created by incumbent ﬁrms and is given by
˜ χHi(θ|I,ξi)
q(θ) .
113.2 Short Run General Equilibrium
Now, we determine the ‘short-run’ general equilibrium, taking as given the number of ﬁrms ni in each industry. In our
setting, this is equivalent to pinning down all equilibrium variables as functions of the degree of competition ξi. This
will allow us to determine the impact of increasing competition on equilibrium unemployment and wages.
DEFINITION 2 Short-run General Equilibrium
A short-run general equilibrium is deﬁned for given (ξi,ni) and parameters (β,σ,b,ΦV ,δ,χ,r,A) as a value of θ
which:
(i) is a ﬁrm-level equilibrium satisfying (23)-(25)
(ii) is a symmetric Cournot equilibrium in each industry satisfying (26) and ξi = niσ for all i








Hi (θ|I,ξi) + ΦV vi
¸
nidf (i) (28)
where f (i) is the distribution of industries.
12
When all industries i are identical and are distributed uniformly over the unit interval we obtain a simpler version








Hi (θ|I,ξi) + ΦV vi
¸
ni. (29)


























When the economy approaches full competition [as ξ → ∞], (31) reduces to the standard condition A > b that
workers’ productivity be greater in employment than in unemployment.
Equation (30) is key, since it relates the degree of competition ξ to short-run equilibrium labor market tightness θ.
Once we have θ(ξ), we can obtain the equilibrium unemployment rate from the Beveridge curve:
u(ξ) =
χ
χ + θ(ξ)q [θ(ξ)]
. (32)
The remainder of equilibrium variables are found as follows: Given the total number of agents in the economy N,
we can ﬁnd equilibrium aggregate employment as niHi (ξ) = N [1 − u(ξ)]. We will ﬁnd it convenient to normalize
12Note that it is not necessary to take the measure δ of pre-entry ﬁrms into account in aggregate income. They do not yet produce and only incur
vacancy costs ΦVe vi, where e vi =
Hi
q(θ) are sufﬁcient to reach the ﬁrm’s steady-state employment level at the start of the next period. Hence the
ﬁrm’s proﬁts and vacancy costs sum to zero.
12N = 1. With H (ξ) in hand, we can ﬁnd aggregate output and subsequently the equilibrium quantity of good i,
and of course short-run equilibrium employment per ﬁrm Hi (ξ) and price Pi (ξ), all in terms of the given degree of
competition.
3.2.1 An Equivalence Result
Equation (30) makes it clear that equilibrium θ depends only upon the demand elasticity facing the ﬁrm ξ, and not
on either of its components n or σ independently. This implies that it is equivalent to vary competition by varying
the number of ﬁrms per industry [as we do here] or by varying the elasticity of substitution among goods σ as in
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003). This equivalence result depends on the way in which vacancy costs are treated in
aggregate income. Here, we include vacancy posting costs in aggregate income, thereby implicitly assuming that
vacancy posting costs are not ’thrown out the window’, but are rather paid in return for services like advertising.13
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In this case, σ does play an independent role, and hence varying n and σ is no longer equivalent14.
3.2.2 Comparative Statics I: Varying Competition
The characterization of short-term equilibrium allows us to examine the qualitative impact of varying the degree of
competition ξ on short-term equilibrium unemployment and wages. It is straightforward to check that increasing our
measure of competition ξ will lead to decreased equilibrium unemployment and to increased equilibrium wages. These
and other comparative static results for short-term equilibrium are summarized in Lemma 1 and Proposition 1. All
proofs are found in the Appendix.
LEMMA 1 Short-run equilibrium labor market tightness is a strictly increasing function of ﬁrm-level demand elas-
ticity ξ.
PROPOSITION 1 In short-run equilibrium:
(i) unemployment is strictly decreasing in competition ξ,
(ii) wages are strictly increasing in competition ξ.
13It is straightforward to show that aggregate income I is decreasing in ΦV , so that it is not possible to inﬂate aggregate income by increasing
vacancy costs.
14Quantitatively, the two methods of aggregation yield nearly indistinguishable results when competition is varied via the number of ﬁrms per
industry. Details are available from the authors.
13We identify two main channels by which an increase in competition affects employment and unemployment: (1)
the output-expansion channel (2) the hiring externality channel. Via the ﬁrst channel, increased competition leads to
increased employment and decreased unemployment, while the second channel works in the opposite direction.
We ﬁrst focus on the output-expansion channel, which was also identiﬁed by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003). From
equation (23), higher demand elasticity leads to a lower equilibrium price. From (10), industry-level output will clearly
grow in response to lower equilibrium prices. This is the output expansion effect of greater competition, which also
leads to greater industry-level employment via the linear production function. Since steady-state vacancies are directly
related to employment as vi + δe vi = e χHi
q(θ) + δ Hi
q(θ),15 an increase in equilibrium employment leads to an increase in
equilibrium vacancies, and hence to an increase in labor market tightness θ, and a decrease in unemployment via the
Beveridge curve.
The second channel is related to the properties of individual bargaining over wages. Under individual bargaining,
ﬁrms facing imperfectly elastic demand have an incentive to overhire, as described in the previous section. As compe-
tition increases, the hiring externality is diminished, placing downward pressure on vacancies and employment. The
results of Proposition 1 indicate that the ﬁrst channel prevails, so that the net effect of competition on steady-state
employment is indeed positive. However, to what extent the hiring externalities are able to mitigate the detrimental
effects of monopoly power on equilibrium unemployment is a quantitative question, one which we address in the
following section.
Interestingly, Proposition 1 also shows that the equilibrium wage turns out to be increasing in competition. This
conclusion is the opposite of that drawn by the recent literature on wages and the sharing of monopoly rents (e.g. van
Reenen, 1996). The source of the disparity is that the rent-sharing papers typically look at only one isolated industry,
while we consider broader increases in competition which affect all industries at once. The general equilibrium effect
of greater competition is to increase vacancies and tightness in all sectors, making it easier for unemployed workers
to ﬁnd new jobs. This increases the value of the worker’s outside option, thereby improving the worker’s bargaining
position and increasing his/her wage, as illustrated by equation (25) in conjunction with Lemma 1. This is similar to
the positive wage effect of competition found by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003). It is also consistent with data on
labor shares (simply computed as employee compensation over GDP) and entry regulation, as illustrated in Figure 3.
3.2.3 Comparative Statics II: Varying Parameters
Proposition 2 summarizes short-run equilibrium comparative statics.
PROPOSITION 2 Effects of parameters on equilibrium θ and unemployment
In short-run equilibrium:
(i) labor market tightness θ is decreasing in the parameters b, ΦV , r, δ, and e χ;
(ii) unemployment is increasing in the parameters b, ΦV , r, δ and e χ;
15Recall that steady state vacancies are derived from two sources: incumbent and entrant ﬁrms. Incumbent ﬁrms create vi = e χHi
q(θ) vacancies,
while the δ pre-entry ﬁrms createe vi =
Hi
q(θ) vacancies. That is, incumbent ﬁrms replace the fraction e χ of workers from which they expect to be
separated, while entrants must create enough vacancies to hire their entire desired workforce.
14(iii) labor market tightness θ is decreasing in β and unemployment is increasing in β if either b < ΦV
1−δθ or b ≥ ΦV
1−δθ















The results of parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 2 are standard for search and matching models. Part (iii) merits
comment. Unemployment’s reaction to an increase in workers’ bargaining power is standard, unless the degree of
competition is very low. The intuition is that higher workers’ bargaining power strengthens the overhiring effect, in
the sense that ∂
2w
∂Hi∂β < 0 for given Hi and Pi. At very low levels of competition, the overhiring effect discussed in
section 2.4 is particularly strong. In this case, increasing bargaining power strengthens the overhiring effect so much
[i.e. increasing ﬁrms’ incentives to hire more workers to depress wages], that the end result is lower unemployment.
3.3 Long-run General Equilibrium
Now we are ready to endogenize the degree of competition, or equivalently, the number of ﬁrms in each industry. In
the long-run, ﬁrms may enter each industry by paying a real entry cost ΦE. Entry by ﬁrms will continue until proﬁts
net of entry costs within each industry have been competed down to zero. Hence, free entry in the presence of barriers







where the ﬁrm’s equilibrium proﬁts per period are given by (27). The free entry condition (33) states that the entry
cost must be amortized by proﬁts over the ﬁrm’s expected lifespan. The greater is the ﬁrm’s exit probability δ, the
higher must be the equilibrium proﬁts to amortize a given level of entry costs. Since equilibrium proﬁts are decreasing
in competition, free entry forges a negative link between barriers to entry and the number of ﬁrms.
Entry barriers may take two complementary forms, time and pecuniary costs. Both the data on entry costs collected
by Logotech, S.A. for the OECD (as reported in Fonseca, et. al. (2001)) and that of Djankov, et. al. (2002) report
the time it takes to satisfy all regulatory entry requirements. In addition, Djankov, et. al. (2002) present data on the
ofﬁcial fees which must be paid in order to obtain all licenses and permits, as a percentage of annual per capita GDP.
We combine the fee and regulatory delay measures to obtain a single quantiﬁcation of barriers to entry. We convert
the regulatory delay (measured in months) into a pecuniary opportunity cost consisting of lost proﬁts during the setup-
period, plus the wages of one worker who is charged with setting up the ﬁrm. This implies that a day of waiting is











+ f · I (n). (34)
where d is the regulatory delay and f are entry fees as a share of aggregate monthly income. Combining (34) with the


















Equation (35) closes the long-run equilibrium. It implicitly determines the endogenous long-run industry size n∗,
or equivalently, it determines the endogenous degree of competition ξ∗ = σn∗ in long-run equilibrium. As long as
15d < 1+r
r+δ, as is the case in all the data reported in Table 1, equation (35) deﬁnes a negative relationship between
barriers to entry and the degree of competition in long-run equilibrium. Hence, an increase in entry barriers of either
form leads to a long-run equilibrium decrease in industry size n∗ or equivalently, to a decrease in the demand elasticity
faced by ﬁrms ξ∗.
4 Quantitative Results
We are now in a position to calibrate our model and approach our quantitative questions. We ﬁrst explain in detail
how we calibrate the basic model to match a set of labor market data from the United States. Then, for this cali-
bration we ask: What is the impact of increasing competition on equilibrium unemployment and wages? That is, we
examine by how much unemployment decreases and by how much wages increase due to an increase in our measure
of competition [demand elasticity ξ]. Next, we run two policy experiments, each of which is designed to gauge the
relative importance of entry costs and unemployment beneﬁts in accounting for the difference in U.S. and continental
European unemployment rates.
4.1 Calibration
One model period is one month. All parameters are reported in Table 2. We use estimates from the literature to guide
our choices for the ﬁrst group of parameters. The bargaining power of workers, β, has recently been estimated between
20%, (Cahuc, Gianella, Goux and Zylberberg, 2002) and 50% (Abowd and Allain, 1996, Yashiv, 2001). Petrongolo
and Pissarides (2001) report η, the elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment, to be in the range
of [0.4;0.7]. We set β = η = 0.5, thus choosing standard values and imposing the Hosios (1990) condition.16 For
simplicity, we normalize the level of technology A to unity. Our choice for the annualized real interest rate r = 0.04
is standard. Unemployment beneﬁts in the U.S. replace 50% of the past income for half a year, so we choose b to
be 0.274, which is roughly consistent with a replacement rate17 of 30%. In our setting, the choice of the elasticity of
substitution among goods σ has no impact on the endogenously determined elasticity of substitution facing individual
ﬁrms ξ. Since ξ = nσ, our choice of σ only serves to normalize the equilibrium number of ﬁrms per industry. We take
σ = 2.
We choose the remaining parameters to match some stylized labor market data for the U.S. during the period
1989–2002. Speciﬁcally, we replicate an unemployment rate of 5.53%, an average duration of unemployment of 3.8
months (corresponding to a worker’s matching rate of θq (θ) = 0.26), and an adjusted18 vacancy/unemployment ratio
of 0.3. The latter ﬁgure is consistent with the JOLTS database, where the average of the vacancy/unemployment ratio
16In section 5 we show that the Hosios condition is necessary but not sufﬁcient for social efﬁciency in our setup. Our result augments that of
Smith (1999). While Smith (1999) requires constant returns to labor for efﬁciency, what matters here is a constant marginal revenue product of
labor.
17Rather than introducing heterogeneity among unemployed by cutting off their beneﬁts, we prefer to adjust the generosity of unemployment
compensation. This is standard, as is the choice of a 30% replacement ratio for the United States (see e.g. Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998)).
18The terminology of our model is somewhat misleading. What is called a vacancy in the model is not directly comparable to a vacancy in the
data because ﬁrms post as many vacancies so as to hire in expectation the desired number of workers. Therefore we adjust the vacancies coming
16for the period 19 beginning 1/2002 is one third. The exogenous total separation rate χ = 0.0154, is pinned down by the
Beveridge curve in conjunction with our values for unemployment and unemployment duration. We set δ = 0.01, so
that the monthly probability that a ﬁrm will cease to exist is in line with the one and ﬁve year ﬁrm survival probabilities
reported in Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988), Mata and Portugal (1994) and Wagner (1994). Finally, the scaling
parameter of the matching function s must satisfy s = 0.26
θ1−η.
We are left with a long-run equilibrium condition (35) which relates vacancy posting costs ΦV to ﬁrm’s demand
elasticity ξ. We close the model by choosing a value for ΦV . We choose that level of vacancy posting costs which
leads to a long-term U.S. equilibrium unemployment rate of 5.53 %. This leads to a value of ΦV = 0.573, so that
hiring costs per worker are q (θ)ΦV = 2.41 units of output, which corresponds to about 21 % of annual payroll. This
is consistent with Hamermesh and Pfann (1996), who report ﬁxed hiring costs in the range of 20% to 100% of annual
payroll expenses for a worker.
Finally, we also calibrate a balanced budget version of the model in which unemployment beneﬁts are ﬁnanced by
equal magnitude income and payroll taxes (τI,τP). The only parameter affected is equilibrium vacancy posting costs
ΦV , which falls slightly to 0.547. In the US model economy, income and payroll taxes of less than 1% are necessary
to ﬁnance unemployment beneﬁts.
4.2 A little bit of competition goes a long way
Figure 2 shows how equilibrium labor market variables react as the degree of competition is varied exogenously in the
calibrated model. The quantitative message is clear: A little bit of competition goes a long way. The main beneﬁts to
competition for employment and wages are due to the transition between monopoly and oligopoly, not to the transition
from oligopoly to perfect competition. The top left hand panel of Figure 2 plots the equilibrium unemployment rate
u against the number20 of ﬁrms per industry, our measure of competition. The decrease in unemployment can be
attributed [via the Beveridge curve] to the increase in labor market tightness depicted in the upper right panel of Figure
2.
However, the total impact of competition on unemployment is surprisingly modest. By increasing the number of
ﬁrms per industry from one to ﬁve, equilibrium unemployment falls by less than two percentage points, from 7.62% to
about 5.69 %. Put another way, even if all continental European industries were monopolies, while all US industries
were perfectly competitive, the model would only predict a difference of slightly more than two percentage points of
unemployment, less than half the actual gap of about 3.95% over the period 1989-2002.
The impact of competition on short-run equilibrium wages and proﬁts is considerably stronger. The middle panels








19The JOLTS database only offers vacancy data starting 12/2000.
20Recall that the number of ﬁrms is the result of a normalization via σ. The more meaningful - but perhaps less intuitive - measure of product
market competition is the demand elasticity ξ faced by each individual ﬁrm. In all of our calibrations, ξ = nσ and σ = 2.0, so doubling the number
of ﬁrms gives the demand elasticity.
17of Figure 2 show that equilibrium wages increase by about 50% when the number of ﬁrms is increased from 1 to 5,
while per-ﬁrm equilibrium proﬁts drop to about 1/10th of their monopoly levels. That wages are increasing despite
shrinking proﬁts may seem surprising initially. It is useful to recall, however, that the equilibrium wage is the sum of
two components: a share β of match surplus and the value of the worker’s outside option. Greater competition leads
to higher equilibrium labor market tightness, so that unemployed workers ﬁnd it easier to ﬁnd a new job, raising the
equilibrium value of unemployment - or equivalently the worker’s outside option - which leads to an increase in the
reservation wage. Although equilibrium match surplus increases slightly as well [in equilibrium the marginal worker
must become more valuable as θ increases, because it is more costly to search for him/her], it is the improvement in
the worker’s bargaining position which accounts for the vast majority of the increase in wages due to competition.
4.3 Income Taxes
In order to run policy experiments, we must also take into account that unemployment beneﬁts must generally be
ﬁnanced by taxes. We impose equal magnitude income and payroll taxes, which are just large enough to ﬁnance the




[1 − u] = bu. (36)
































+ f · I (n). (38)
4.4 A Simple Policy Experiment
We now use the balanced budget version of the model to run a simple policy experiment, whose goal is to gauge the
relative importance of product and labor market institutions in accounting for the US-continental Europe unemploy-
ment differential. In particular, differing labor market institutions [LMI] are represented as differing levels of real
unemployment beneﬁts bUS = 0.274 and bEuro = 0.554, which correspond to replacement rates of 30% and 70% re-
spectively. Differing product market institutions [PMI] are represented as differing entry cost regimes {dEuro,fEuro}
and {dUS,fUS}.21 To decompose the total resulting unemployment differential into PMI and LMI components, we
move from the US to the continental European calibration in two steps. Taking the calibration to US data as a start-
ing point, we ﬁrst increase b so that the replacement rate takes on its continental European value, while maintaining
low US entry costs. The difference between the US and hybrid long-run equilibrium unemployment rates ∆uLMI
gives the unemployment differential due to the labor market institution. In the second step, we move from the hy-
brid to the continental European economy by increasing entry costs to continental European levels. This allows us to
21Following Fonseca, et. al. (2001) and Pissarides (2001), we use the regulatory delay index based on the Logotech/OECD data, together with
Djankov, et. al. (2002)’s cost data.
18calculate ∆uPMI, the unemployment differential due to the product market institution. Also of interest will be the
share of the total difference in long-run equilibrium unemployment rates which is due to PMI, which we deﬁne as
sharePMI ≡ ∆uPMI
∆uPMI+∆uLMI .
The long-run equilibrium for the US economy is shown in column [1] of Table 3, while columns [2] and [3]
represent the hybrid and continental European long-run equilibria respectively. Product market regulation is only
responsible for about 13% of the US-continental European unemployment differential. In absolute terms, stricter
continental European product market regulation is responsible for about ∆uPMI = 0.42 percentage points of unem-
ployment, while more generous unemployment beneﬁts are responsible for about ∆uLMI = 2.79 percentage points
of additional unemployment. 22 This indicates that although product market deregulation is likely to have some im-
pact on unemployment, labor market reforms would clearly seem to be considerably more effective. The reason can
again be traced to the countervailing hiring externality inherent in the individual bargaining setup, which effectively
counteracts much of the detrimental impact of monopoly power on unemployment.23
4.5 A Second Policy Experiment: Interactions between b and ΦE
Inherent in the policy experiment presented above is an ordering of reforms. In the previous subsection, we have
chosen to examine the effects of ﬁrst deregulating continental European product markets, and then reforming labor
markets. It is important to note that this maximizes the unemployment-impact of product market reform. At higher
levels of unemployment beneﬁts, entry costs have a greater negative impact on employment and wages.
The reason is that there is a pernicious interaction between the level of unemployment beneﬁts and entry costs, as
illustrated in Figure 4. Even if a given differential in entry costs results in exactly the same differential in tightness,
the impact of that tightness differential on unemployment varies according to b. The reason is that higher-b equilibria
involve lower levels of labor market tightness. By the Beveridge curve, unemployment reacts more sensitively to a
given tightness differential when tightness is low. This is simply due to the constant returns to scale feature of the
matching function, which leads to worker’s matching rates λw ≡ θq (θ) to display decreasing returns to scale in
tightness θ.
To quantify this interaction, we run a second policy experiment. Now, we deﬁne the hybrid economy as being
that which combines high European-style entry costs with low US replacement rates. As a result, the increase in
unemployment due to PMI shrinks even further. This is reﬂected in the ﬁnal column of Table 3. When entry costs
are varied at low levels of unemployment beneﬁts, the difference in entry barriers can only account for 0.29 % points
of unemployment differential, which corresponds to about 9 % of the total US-continental European unemployment
differential.
22These two institutions fall short of explaining the entire gap between US and continental European unemployment rates, which was 3.95
percentage points over the period 1990-2002, according to BLS data. Recall that there are other institutional differences such as ﬁring costs from
which we abstract here.
23In a companion paper, we show that under collective bargaining, entry barriers can indeed account for a substantially larger portion of the
US-continental European unemployment gap.
194.6 Wage Impact
We conﬁrm the quantitative relevance of Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003)’s political economy argument. These authors
assert that the package of product and labor market reform may be more palatable to workers than labor market reform
alone, since the spoonful of sugar of product market reform-induced wage increases would make the bitter medicine
of labor market reform easier to swallow24. Indeed, in our ﬁrst policy experiment workers would be compensated for
the loss of unemployment beneﬁts with a substantial competition-induced net real wage increase of about 11 %, which
corresponds to an increase in net real wages from 0.792 to 0.879. This wage increase holds regardless of whether
labor or product market reform is introduced ﬁrst. Once again, nearly all of the competition-induced wage increase is
due to the increase in workers’ reservation utility. Greater product market competition leads to higher rates of vacancy
creation, increasing labor market tightness and making it easier for unemployed workers to ﬁnd jobs. This increases
the value of workers’ outside option of unemployment and renewed job search, improving their bargaining position.
Furthermore, Figure 3 illustrates the empirical relevance of product market reform for wages.
4.7 Robustness
We now proceed to check the robustness of our quantitative results to our ’free’ parameter choices. The only parame-
ters in which we are guided by, but not pinned down by, the data are matching elasticity η, worker’s bargaining power
β and ﬁrm death rate δ. The purpose of this section is to check the robustness of our results to these three semi-free
parameters. We ﬁnd that our choice of these parameter values is innocuous and has only negligible effects on the
results that we report.
4.7.1 Setup
We take the calibration to the U.S. economy as a starting point and vary the variable of interest (e.g. ﬁrm death rate)
over a wide range of values (e.g. [0;0.0154], so that for the highest value all breakups are caused by ﬁrm-closures).
For each of these values we recalibrate the model to still ﬁt our targets of a 5.53% unemployment rate, 3.8 months
unemployment duration, 4.2 months vacancy duration and a replacement rate of 0.30. The top left panel in ﬁgures
5–7 reports how vacancy posting costs, ΦV , and the scaling parameter of the matching function have to be adjusted to
meet our calibration targets. The top left panel also shows the effect of this recalibration on the long-run equilibrium
demand elasticity that ﬁrms face. This recalibration is important, because it allows us to compare results across
different parameter values directly.
Based on the recalibrated models we then conduct three regulation experiments. Each experiment is conducted
for 30 different values of the variable of interest (δ,η,β). Starting from U.S. entry barriers, experiment D varies the
administrative delay from the U.S. level of 7.5 days to 600 days, which is roughly ten times the European entry delay.
The results of experiment D are reported in the top right panel of diagrams 5–7. Again starting from the U.S. level of
0.5% of per capita GDP experiment F varies the administrative fees up to a level of 200% of per capita GDP (which
24A similar result is found by Seldeslachts (2002) in an efﬁciency wage model and by Peretto (2000) in a growth model.
20is roughly 40 times the European level of fees) while keeping the entry delay at its U.S. level of 7.5 days. The results
of experiment F are reported in the bottom left panel of diagrams 5–7. Finally, experiment M considers multiples of
U.S. entry barriers from 1 to 50. Again this surpasses the data by far. EU delay is about nine times higher than U.S.
delay; EU fees are roughly 40 times higher than their U.S. counterparts. The results of experiment M are reported in
the bottom right panel of diagrams 5–7.
4.7.2 Results
When analyzing ﬁrm death rate, δ (ﬁgure 5) we realize that no modiﬁcations in vacancy posting costs or the scaling
parameter are necessary to maintain our calibration targets. This is not surprising as an increase in the ﬁrm death
rate translates almost one to one in a reduction in the exogenous match-breakup rate. We note, however, that the
equilibrium demand elasticity falls substantially as the ﬁrm death rate increases. Higher ﬁrm death rates imply less
time to recoup the entry-cost investment and thus lead to fewer ﬁrms in equilibrium — which manifests itself in the
falling ﬁrm-level demand elasticity. The striking ﬁnding is that it is indeed possible to achieve an unemployment
rate of more than 8%. However, this is only obtained for a setup where all separations are due to ﬁrm-closures and
additionally administrative delay is at 600 days, i.e. 10 times its actual European level! For the observed European
entry barriers our ﬁndings of a negligible effect of entry barriers holds for any possible choice of ﬁrm death rates.
Let us next consider the matching elasticity, η (ﬁgure 6). We analyze variations of η in the interval [0.1;0.9] and
recall that our chosen value was 0.5. It turns out that the calibration is remarkably insensitive to choices of η and
small variations in the scaling parameter of the matching functions are sufﬁcient to reestablish compliance with our
calibration targets. Very low values of the matching elasticity indeed lead to strong effects of regulation. However,
similar to the case of the ﬁrm death rate, this effect only kicks in after surpassing European values of entry barriers.
The economic intuition behind this ﬁnding is quite simple. High matching elasticities imply that worker matching
probabilities only change very little25 in response to a larger amount of available vacancies that would be brought
about by deregulation. In addition, ﬁrm matching-probabilities react very sharply. On the other hand, low values of
η imply that worker matching rates react sharply to an increase in vacancies, which has a direct positive effect on
bargained wages and therefore kills off the job-growth process almost immediately. We conclude that it is possible to
obtain unemployment rates of up to 8% if one is willing to assume extremely low matching elasticities of η = 0.1 and
an administrative delay 10 times higher than observed in Europe. For any value of entry barriers actually observed in
the data unemployment rates barely exceed 6%.
Finally, in graph 7 we consider the robustness of our results to variations in the bargaining power β of workers.
Lower worker bargaining power requires substantially higher vacancy posting costs to remain at our original calibra-
tion targets for the 5.53% unemployment rate. For β = 0.2, ΦV = 1.93, wages drop considerably and the number of
ﬁrms increases substantially. Nevertheless, deregulation has the strongest effects for low values of worker bargaining
power because this is when the overhiring effect is smallest. However, even for such low bargaining powers the un-
employment rate for European level entry costs barely surpasses 6.0%. The highest unemployment rates that can be
25Recall that the ﬁrm matching-probability is given by θ−η and the worker matching-probability by θ1−η.
21achieved are a maximum of 7% for entry regulations that either involve delays of 600 days or fees twice as high as per
capita GDP.
To sum up, our reported result that increasing the regulation of entry to the U.S. product market to European levels
has only negligible employment consequences is consistent with a wide array of choices for our somewhat ‘free’
parameters and by no means a special case of our model.
5 Social Efﬁciency
We now consider the welfare implications of differing degrees of product market competition under individual bar-
gaining. This allows us to make more precise the countervailing effects of monopoly power on the one hand, and
the hiring and search externalities on the other. Any setup where ﬁrms take their product market power into account
will lead to underprovision of goods, and hence underhiring. At the same time ﬁrms in individual bargaining settings
have an incentive to overhire and thus overproduce (Stole and Zwiebel, 1996) which may counteract some of the
monopoly distortions. Thus, one might see individual bargaining as inducing monopolistically competitive ﬁrms to
’self-regulate’ and increase output, bringing them closer to the social optimum.26 In the following, we compare the
monopolistic competition and individual bargaining equilibrium to the social optimum.
The social planner wishes to maximize per capita aggregate consumption, subject to matching frictions. Total
output of the economy can simply be written as AH where H is aggregate employment. Furthermore, given that all
goods enter the utility function symmetrically, and H = (1 − u), per capita consumption of the aggregate good is
given by A(1 − u). Using our deﬁnition of labor market tightness we can write economy wide per-period vacancy
posting costs as ΦV θu so that the per period social welfare function becomes A(1 − u) − ΦV θu.To focus on the
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for all t (39)
where η denotes the elasticity of the matching function with respect to θ, i.e. η = −
θq
0(θ)
q(θ) .Combining the ﬁrst order
conditions for θt and ut+1, using the envelope condition and imposing the steady state condition that θt = θ and










(r + χ) (40)
By comparing (40) to the equilibrium condition of the monopolistic competition-individual bargaining economy
(30), we ﬁnd two conditions for social efﬁciency:
26See also the discussion in Pissarides (2000) pages 198–201.
221. β = η, the standard Hosios condition;
2.
ξ−β
ξ−1 = 1, which reﬂects the monopoly distortion (through ξ) and the overhiring effect (via β). As ξ → ∞ these
distortions disappear.
To examine whether (un)employment is below or above its socially efﬁcient level, we compare the socially efﬁcient
equilibrium condition (40) to its monopolistic-competition-individual bargaining counterpart (30). For any ﬁnite value
of ξ, the monopoly and overhiring distortions will exactly cancel one another whenever β = 1. When β < 1, however,
the monopoly distortion dominates, leading to a socially sub-optimal equilibrium θ and higher-than socially optimal
unemployment rate in the individual bargaining economy. The intuition is that when workers have all of the bargaining
power, wages are very high and the hiring externality strongest. At lower levels of bargaining power, β < 1, the hiring
externality is diminished, and the monopoly distortion is able to dominate.
The search friction, as reﬂected in the Hosios condition, is neutralized whenever β = η. Recalling that the RHS of
both the socially efﬁcient equilibrium condition (40) and its individual bargaining counterpart (30) are increasing in θ,
β, and η, we can infer that for η < β the search friction causes unemployment to be above its socially efﬁcient level.
However, for η > β the search friction implies a lower-than optimal level of unemployment.
Note that under imperfect competition, both conditions for social optimum will only be satisﬁed simultaneously if
β = η = 1, which would involve both a degenerate matching function and giving all bargaining power to the workers.
Under perfect competition, the standard Hosios condition becomes necessary and sufﬁcient for social efﬁciency. 27.
Our speciﬁcation of β = η < 1 unambiguously leads to inefﬁciently low employment levels. In this case, the
search friction is neutralized, while the net effect of the monopoly and individual bargaining distortions is unemploy-
ment which is greater than the socially optimal level. Similarly, whenever η < β ≤ 1, both the net effect of the
monopoly and individual bargaining distortions and the search friction imply underemployment, leading to an equilib-
rium level of unemployment which is unambiguously greater than the socially efﬁcient level. However, for β < η < 1,
the search friction implies overemployment whereas the monopoly distortion still suggests underemployment. Given
that the two distortions work in opposite directions, it is not clear in this last case whether the level of unemployment
will be too low or too high in the decentralized equilibrium as compared to the socially efﬁcient outcome.
Our social efﬁciency analysis allows us to contribute to the recent debate on the robustness of Stole and Zwiebel
(1996a)’s overhiring results. Although we ﬁnd clear evidence of a hiring externality from (21), we also ﬁnd that the net
effect of the intertwined monopoly distortion and hiring externality is underhiring. There is, however, a further, wage-
based deﬁnition of overhiring, as noted by Stole and Zwiebel (2003): ﬁrms engage in overhiring when workers’ wages
are lower than their internal marginal (revenue) product to the ﬁrm. That is, a worker who would not be hired based
on his contribution to marginal output alone is hired due to his contribution to depressing wages. In our setting, this
deﬁnition of overhiring is satisﬁed whenever
ξ−1
ξ APi (Hi) < w(Hi).28 From equations (23) and (24), wage-based
27Our ﬁndings are consistent with Smith (1999), who studies social efﬁciency for the case of perfect competition and decreasing returns to scale,
and Cahuc and Wasmer (2001) who study perfect competition and constant returns to scale.


















In our baseline US calibration, this condition is satisﬁed whenever ξ < 353.1, a very broad range indeed. In general,
lower levels of competition and higher values of worker’s bargaining power β will tend to favor the wage-based
overhiring criterion.
6 Conclusions
The main objective of this paper has been to study the relationship between product market regulation and labor mar-
ket outcomes. Our main contribution is twofold. First, we develop a dynamic model with imperfect competition and
search frictions, which is not only well suited for the quantitative analysis of the present paper but also for studies
of interactions between competition and the choice of bargaining regime (Ebell and Haefke, 2003) or interactions of
regional labor market institutions and monetary policy (Faia and Haefke, 2003). Our model contains the interest-
ing feature that the standard monopoly distortion of underproduction is partially offset by an overhiring incentive,
especially when monopoly power is high.
We then use our model to answer two quantitative questions: (1) What is the impact of increasing product-market
competition on equilibrium employment and wages? and (2) What proportion of the US-continental European un-
employment difference can be accounted for by differences in entry barriers. We ﬁnd that it is the transition from
monopoly to a few ﬁrms per sector that has a larger impact on unemployment rates, hence a little competition goes
a long way. When we expose a calibrated United States economy to European entry costs we observe an increase in
the unemployment rate of about half a percentage point or slightly more than 10% of the unemployment rate differ-
ential between the U.S. and Europe. Thus, while our qualitative ﬁnding that product market deregulation has positive
repercussions on labor market outcomes is in accordance with the previous literature, we are the ﬁrst to quantify the
effect of deregulation in a fully microfounded dynamic model and conclude that this effect is substantially smaller
than conjectured by previous authors.












and would lead to a slightly higher upper bound on ξ.
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27A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof We need to establish that ∂θ



























The ﬁrst term and the numerator of the second term are clearly positive since β ∈ (0,1) and ξ > 1. For a con-
stant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas matching function q0 (θ) < 0, so that the denominator is also guaranteed to be
positive. 2
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof (i) From (32) and applying Lemma 1, it is straightforward to show that ∂u
∂ξ < 0 whenever q (θ) + θq0 (θ) > 0.
This latter condition holds for all Cobb-Douglas constant returns to scale matching functions.


















where the last inequality is due to Lemma 1 and the fact that q0 (θ) < 0 for any CRS Cobb-Douglas matching function.
2
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2





∂e χ are all negative. In each case, we apply the implicit





∂θ where x is the relevant parameter and derivatives are
taken with respect to the RHS of (30). It is easy to see that the denominator is positive for all constant returns to scale
matching functions, so it remains to establish that the numerator
∂[·]











































































∂r can be shown to be positive by combining (i) with Lemma 1. For ∂u





θq [θ](1 − δ) − χ ∂θ
∂e χ [θq0 (θ) + q (θ)]





θq [θ](1 − e χ) − χ ∂θ
∂e χ [θq0 (θ) + q (θ)]
[χ + θq [θ]]
2
In both cases, the denominator is clearly positive, as is the ﬁrst term of the numerator. It remains to show that the
second term of the numerator is negative: this is indeed the case because we have established in (i) that ∂θ
∂e χ < 0 and
because θq0 (θ) + q (θ) > 0 for CRS Cobb-Douglas matching functions.









































> 0. Consider two
mutually exclusive cases:
∂[·]
∂β is either decreasing or increasing in ξ. In the former case,
∂[·]
∂β > 0 at ξ → ∞ ensures
that
∂[·]
∂β > 0 everywhere. We proceed by ﬁrst showing that
∂[·]
∂β is decreasing in ξ whenever b < ΦV

















∂β∂ξ < 0 whenever b < ΦV
1−δθ. This implies that if b < ΦV
1−δθ, then ∂θ
∂β < 0 and by Lemma 1 ∂u
∂θ > 0. In the
latter, we can use that ξ ∈ (1,∞) and check whether
∂[·]
∂β = 0 for a theshold value e ξ which is in the admissible range













It is straightforward to see that whenever b > ΦV
1−δθ, then e ξ > 1 - so that
∂[·]
∂β goes negative for some admissible value
of ξ ∈ (1,∞). This implies that when b > ΦV
1−δθ, then ∂θ










rest of the proof follows by applying Lemma 1. 2
29B Tables
Table 1: Entry Costs
Dataset OECD Djankov, et. al.
Country Days Procedures Index Days Procedures Fees
Austria 40 10 35.2 37 9 27.3 %
Belgium 30 7 25.6 33 8 10.0 %
France 30 16 39.3 53 15 14.3 %
Germany 80 10 55.2 42 10 15.7 %
Greece 32.5 28 58.7 36 15 58.6 %
Italy 50 25 62.9 62 16 20.0 %
Netherlands 60 9 43.7 31 8 18.4 %
Portugal 40 10 35.2 76 12 18.4 %
Spain 117.5 17 84.5 82 11 17.3 %
Euro Average 62.2 – 54.7 51.9 – 18.4 %
United States 7.5 3.5 8.6 4 0.5 %
The ’Days’ column gives the number of business days necessary to start a new ﬁrm, while the ’Procedures’ column
gives the number of entry procedures which new ﬁrms must complete. The ’Index’ column combines the ’Days’ and
’Procedures’ measures as (days + procedures/(ave procedures/day))/2, so that the indexes’ units are days. The ﬁrst
two columns draw on 1997 data from Logotech S.A., as reported by the OECD [Fostering Entrepreneurship] and
by Fonseca,et.al. (2001). The index is calculated as in Fonseca, et. al. (2001) but for a different (restricted) set of
countries. The fourth and ﬁfth column present the respective days and procedures measures reported by Djankov,
et.al. (2002) for 1997. The sixth column gives Djankov, et.al. (2002)’s measure for fees required for entry, as a
percentage of per capita GDP.
30Table 2: Calibration to U.S. data
β 0.5 Worker bargaining power
η 0.5 Elasticity of the matching function
¯ A 1 Average level of labor productivity
r 0.00327 4% Annual interest rate
bUS 0.274 Real unemployment beneﬁts, US
bEuro 0.554 Real unemployment beneﬁts, European
σ 2.0 Substitution elasticity
χ 0.0154 Total separation rate
δ 0.0100 Probability of ﬁrm exit
s 0.2503 Scaling parameter of the matching function
31Table 3: Baseline Calibration, Policy Experiments I and II
[1] [2] [3] [4]
US ΦE, US b US ΦE, EU b EU ΦE, EU b EU ΦE, US b
Unemployment u(ξ∗) 5.53 % 8.32 % 8.74 % 5.82 %
Labor market tightness θ(ξ∗) 1.11 0.46 0.41 0.99
Unemployment duration 1
q(θ) 3.8 5.9 6.2 4.0
Vacancy duration 1
θq(θ) 4.2 2.7 2.6 4.0




P (1 − τI) 0.912 0.879 0.792 0.825
Res. Utility rV U 0.877 0.882 0.795 0.792




P 0.0061 0.0063 0.0583 0.0588
Markup 2.9 % 3.4 % 14.3 % 13.4 %
Tax rates τI = τP 0.89 % 3.28 % 3.47 % 0.94 %
Vacancy costs ΦV 0.547 0.547 0.547 0.547
Real unemployment beneﬁt b 0.274 0.616 0.554 0.248
Replacement rate 0.30 0.70 0.70 0.30
This table presents the equilibrium values for main variables of four economies. Column [1] gives results for the US
economy, while column [3] gives results for the continental European economy. Columns [2] and [4] present hybrid
economies. Column [2] gives results for the economy with low US entry costs but a high European replacement rate.
Column [4] gives results for the economy with high European entry costs but a low US replacement rate.
32Table 4: Summary of Results and Robustness of Calibration to Entry Cost Data
Policy Experiment I II
∆u[PMI] 0.42 % 0.29 %
∆u 3.21 % 3.21 %
share[PMI] 13 % 9 %
∆net w[PMI] 0.088 0.087
∆net w 0.120 0.120
share[PMI] 73 % 72 %
% inc net w 11 % 11 %
∆θ[PMI] 0.046 0.115
∆θ 0.693 0.693
share[θ] 7 % 17 %
This table summarizes the results of policy experiments I and II. ∆u[PMI] is the change in the unemployment rate
due to product market institutions, the difference between columns [3] and [2] for Experiment I and between [4] and
[1] for Experiment II in Table 3. ∆u is the total change in the unemployment rate, the difference between [3] and [1].
share [PMI] is equal to
∆u[PMI]
∆u .The ∆net wand ∆θ variables are deﬁned analogously, but of course refer to
the changes in net (after-tax) real wages and equilibrium labor market tightness, respectively. Finally, % inc net w
refers to the percentage increase in net real wages due to lower entry barriers.
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Figure 1: Firm-Level Equilibrium.
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Figure 2: Effect of Firm Level Demand Elasticity on Model Outcomes.


















































Figure 3: Entry Regulation and naive Labor Shares.
Data on compensation/GDP is taken from Gollin (2002), Table 2, column 4. Data on entry regulation is the regulation index of
Fonseca et al. (2001), table 2, column 4, multiplied by 5 to convert to days. The negative correlation is highly signiﬁcant even for
the small number of observations. This plot is merely meant to be an illustration of the data.










Beveridge Curve: Interactions between Entry Costs and b
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Figure 7: Bargaining Power.